FortiGate SSO Login Followed by Administrator Account Creation

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FortiGate SSO Login Followed by Administrator Account Creation

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This rule detects a FortiCloud SSO login followed by administrator account creation on the same FortiGate device within 15 minutes. This sequence is a high-confidence indicator of the FG-IR-26-060 attack pattern, where threat actors authenticate via SAML-based SSO bypass and immediately create local administrator accounts for persistence.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • logs-fortinet_fortigate.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 10m

Searches indices from: now-30m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Persistence
  • Resources: Investigation Guide
  • Domain: Network
  • Domain: Identity
  • Data Source: Fortinet
  • Data Source: Fortinet FortiGate

Version: 1

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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Triage and analysis

Investigating FortiGate SSO Login Followed by Administrator Account Creation

This alert indicates that a FortiCloud SSO login was followed by an administrator account creation event on the same FortiGate device within 15 minutes. This two-event sequence is the core attack pattern observed in the FG-IR-26-060 campaign.

The attack flow is: authenticate via FortiCloud SSO using a crafted SAML assertion, then immediately create local administrator accounts to maintain access even after the SSO vulnerability is patched.

Possible investigation steps

  • Review the SSO login event for the FortiCloud account used and the source IP. Determine whether the SSO account belongs to the organization.
  • Check the admin creation event for the names of accounts created and the access profiles assigned (especially super_admin).
  • Assess the timing between events. In the observed campaign, admin creation occurs within seconds of SSO login. A tight time correlation is a strong indicator of compromise.
  • Review observer.name to identify the targeted device and verify whether FortiCloud SSO is intentionally enabled. Run get system admin to list all current administrator accounts.
  • Check whether the same SSO account or source IP targeted other devices. Look for configuration exports, firewall policy changes, or VPN modifications following the admin creation.

False positive analysis

  • An authorized administrator logging in via FortiCloud SSO and creating a new admin account as part of normal operations.
  • Initial device onboarding where SSO login and account setup occur in the same session.

Response and remediation

  • If unauthorized, delete all administrator accounts created during the session and disable FortiCloud SSO immediately.
  • Restore configuration from a known-clean backup and rotate all credentials including LDAP/AD accounts connected to the device.
  • Upgrade FortiOS to a patched version and engage incident response for the affected device and any downstream systems.
  • If the activity is expected, document the administrative session and verify it was authorized. Consider creating accounts through a separate session to avoid triggering this correlation.

Rule query

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sequence by observer.name with maxspan=15m
  [authentication where event.dataset == "fortinet_fortigate.log" and
    event.action == "login" and event.outcome == "success" and
    (fortinet.firewall.method == "sso" or fortinet.firewall.ui like~ "sso*")]
  [any where event.dataset == "fortinet_fortigate.log" and
    event.code == "0100044547" and
    fortinet.firewall.cfgpath == "system.admin" and
    fortinet.firewall.action == "Add"]

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM