FortiGate SSO Login Followed by Administrator Account Creation
editFortiGate SSO Login Followed by Administrator Account Creation
editThis rule detects a FortiCloud SSO login followed by administrator account creation on the same FortiGate device within 15 minutes. This sequence is a high-confidence indicator of the FG-IR-26-060 attack pattern, where threat actors authenticate via SAML-based SSO bypass and immediately create local administrator accounts for persistence.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-fortinet_fortigate.*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 10m
Searches indices from: now-30m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
- https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-060
- https://www.fortinet.com/blog/psirt-blogs/analysis-of-sso-abuse-on-fortios
- https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/integrations/fortinet_fortigate
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/01/28/fortinet-releases-guidance-address-ongoing-exploitation-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-cve-2026
Tags:
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Persistence
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Domain: Network
- Domain: Identity
- Data Source: Fortinet
- Data Source: Fortinet FortiGate
Version: 1
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
editTriage and analysis
Investigating FortiGate SSO Login Followed by Administrator Account Creation
This alert indicates that a FortiCloud SSO login was followed by an administrator account creation event on the same FortiGate device within 15 minutes. This two-event sequence is the core attack pattern observed in the FG-IR-26-060 campaign.
The attack flow is: authenticate via FortiCloud SSO using a crafted SAML assertion, then immediately create local administrator accounts to maintain access even after the SSO vulnerability is patched.
Possible investigation steps
- Review the SSO login event for the FortiCloud account used and the source IP. Determine whether the SSO account belongs to the organization.
- Check the admin creation event for the names of accounts created and the access profiles assigned (especially super_admin).
- Assess the timing between events. In the observed campaign, admin creation occurs within seconds of SSO login. A tight time correlation is a strong indicator of compromise.
-
Review
observer.nameto identify the targeted device and verify whether FortiCloud SSO is intentionally enabled. Runget system adminto list all current administrator accounts. - Check whether the same SSO account or source IP targeted other devices. Look for configuration exports, firewall policy changes, or VPN modifications following the admin creation.
False positive analysis
- An authorized administrator logging in via FortiCloud SSO and creating a new admin account as part of normal operations.
- Initial device onboarding where SSO login and account setup occur in the same session.
Response and remediation
- If unauthorized, delete all administrator accounts created during the session and disable FortiCloud SSO immediately.
- Restore configuration from a known-clean backup and rotate all credentials including LDAP/AD accounts connected to the device.
- Upgrade FortiOS to a patched version and engage incident response for the affected device and any downstream systems.
- If the activity is expected, document the administrative session and verify it was authorized. Consider creating accounts through a separate session to avoid triggering this correlation.
Rule query
editsequence by observer.name with maxspan=15m
[authentication where event.dataset == "fortinet_fortigate.log" and
event.action == "login" and event.outcome == "success" and
(fortinet.firewall.method == "sso" or fortinet.firewall.ui like~ "sso*")]
[any where event.dataset == "fortinet_fortigate.log" and
event.code == "0100044547" and
fortinet.firewall.cfgpath == "system.admin" and
fortinet.firewall.action == "Add"]
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Create Account
- ID: T1136
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Local Account
- ID: T1136.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/