Microsoft Entra ID Exccessive Account Lockouts Detected

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Microsoft Entra ID Exccessive Account Lockouts Detected

Identifies a high count of failed Microsoft Entra ID sign-in attempts as the result of the target user account being locked out. Adversaries may attempt to brute-force user accounts by repeatedly trying to authenticate with incorrect credentials, leading to account lockouts by Entra ID Smart Lockout policies.

Rule type: esql

Rule indices: None

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 15m

Searches indices from: now-60m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

Domain: Cloud
Domain: Identity
Data Source: Azure
Data Source: Entra ID
Data Source: Entra ID Sign-in Logs
Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
Use Case: Threat Detection
Tactic: Credential Access
Resources: Investigation Guide

Version: 2

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

edit

Triage and analysis

Investigating Microsoft Entra ID Exccessive Account Lockouts Detected

This rule detects a high number of sign-in failures due to account lockouts (error code 50053) in Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs. These lockouts are typically caused by repeated authentication failures, often as a result of brute-force tactics such as password spraying, credential stuffing, or automated guessing. This detection is time-bucketed and aggregates attempts to identify bursts or coordinated campaigns targeting multiple users.

Possible investigation steps

Review user_id_list and user_principal_name: Check if targeted users include high-value accounts such as administrators, service principals, or shared inboxes.
Check error_codes and result_description: Validate that 50053 (account locked) is the consistent failure type. Messages indicating "malicious IP" activity suggest Microsoft’s backend flagged the source.
Analyze ip_list and source_orgs: Identify whether the activity originated from known malicious infrastructure (e.g., VPNs, botnets, or public cloud providers). In the example, traffic originates from MASSCOM, which should be validated.
Inspect device_detail_browser and user_agent: Clients like "Python Requests" indicate scripted automation rather than legitimate login attempts.
Evaluate unique_users vs. total_attempts: A high ratio suggests distributed attacks across multiple accounts, characteristic of password spraying.
Correlate client_app_display_name and incoming_token_type: PowerShell or unattended sign-in clients may be targeted for automation or legacy auth bypass.
Review conditional_access_status and risk_state: If Conditional Access was not applied and risk was not flagged, policy scope or coverage should be reviewed.
Validate time range (first_seen, last_seen): Determine whether the attack is a short burst or part of a longer campaign.

False positive analysis

Misconfigured clients, scripts, or services with outdated credentials may inadvertently cause lockouts.
Repeated lockouts from known internal IPs or during credential rotation windows could be benign.
Legacy applications without modern auth support may repeatedly fail and trigger Smart Lockout.
Specific known user agents (e.g., corporate service accounts).
Internal IPs or cloud-hosted automation with expected failure behavior.

Response and remediation

Investigate locked accounts immediately. Confirm if the account was successfully accessed prior to lockout.
Reset credentials for impacted users and enforce MFA before re-enabling accounts.
Block malicious IPs or ASN at the firewall, identity provider, or Conditional Access level.
Audit authentication methods in use, and enforce modern auth (OAuth, SAML) over legacy protocols.
Strengthen Conditional Access policies to reduce exposure from weak locations, apps, or clients.
Conduct credential hygiene audits to assess reuse and rotation for targeted accounts.

Rule query

edit

from logs-azure.signinlogs*

| eval
    Esql.time_window_date_trunc = date_trunc(30 minutes, @timestamp),
    Esql_priv.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_principal_name_lower = to_lower(azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_incoming_token_type_lower = to_lower(azure.signinlogs.properties.incoming_token_type),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_display_name_lower = to_lower(azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name)

| where event.dataset == "azure.signinlogs"
    and event.category == "authentication"
    and azure.signinlogs.category in ("NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs", "SignInLogs")
    and event.outcome == "failure"
    and azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_requirement == "singleFactorAuthentication"
    and azure.signinlogs.properties.status.error_code == 50053
    and azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name is not null
    and azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name != ""
    and source.`as`.organization.name != "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-as-BLOCK"

| stats
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_authentication_requirement_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_requirement),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_id_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.app_id),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_display_name_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_resource_id_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_id),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_resource_display_name_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_conditional_access_status_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.conditional_access_status),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_device_detail_browser_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.browser),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_device_detail_device_id_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.device_id),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_device_detail_operating_system_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.operating_system),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_incoming_token_type_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.incoming_token_type),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_risk_state_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.risk_state),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_session_id_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.user_id),
    Esql_priv.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_principal_name_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_description_values = values(azure.signinlogs.result_description),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_signature_values = values(azure.signinlogs.result_signature),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_type_values = values(azure.signinlogs.result_type),

    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_principal_name_lower_count_distinct = count_distinct(Esql_priv.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_principal_name_lower),
    Esql_priv.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_principal_name_lower_values = values(Esql_priv.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_principal_name_lower),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_description_count_distinct = count_distinct(azure.signinlogs.result_description),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_status_error_code_count_distinct = count_distinct(azure.signinlogs.properties.status.error_code),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_status_error_code_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.status.error_code),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_incoming_token_type_lower_values = values(Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_incoming_token_type_lower),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_display_name_lower_values = values(Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_display_name_lower),
    Esql.source_ip_values = values(source.ip),
    Esql.source_ip_count_distinct = count_distinct(source.ip),
    Esql.source_as_organization_name_values = values(source.`as`.organization.name),
    Esql.source_as_organization_name_count_distinct = count_distinct(source.`as`.organization.name),
    Esql.source_geo_country_name_values = values(source.geo.country_name),
    Esql.source_geo_country_name_count_distinct = count_distinct(source.geo.country_name),
    Esql.@timestamp.min = min(@timestamp),
    Esql.@timestamp.max = max(@timestamp),
    Esql.event_count = count()
by Esql.time_window_date_trunc

| where Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_principal_name_lower_count_distinct >= 15 and Esql.event_count >= 20

| keep
    Esql.time_window_date_trunc,
    Esql.event_count,
    Esql.@timestamp.min,
    Esql.@timestamp.max,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_principal_name_lower_count_distinct,
    Esql_priv.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_principal_name_lower_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_description_count_distinct,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_description_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_status_error_code_count_distinct,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_status_error_code_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_incoming_token_type_lower_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_display_name_lower_values,
    Esql.source_ip_values,
    Esql.source_ip_count_distinct,
    Esql.source_as_organization_name_values,
    Esql.source_as_organization_name_count_distinct,
    Esql.source_geo_country_name_values,
    Esql.source_geo_country_name_count_distinct,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_authentication_requirement_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_id_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_display_name_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_resource_id_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_resource_display_name_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_conditional_access_status_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_device_detail_browser_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_device_detail_device_id_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_device_detail_operating_system_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_incoming_token_type_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_risk_state_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_session_id_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_values,
    Esql_priv.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_principal_name_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_description_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_signature_values,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_type_values

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Credential Access
- ID: TA0006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
Technique:
- Name: Brute Force
- ID: T1110
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Password Guessing
- ID: T1110.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Password Spraying
- ID: T1110.003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Credential Stuffing
- ID: T1110.004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004/

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