M365 Portal Login (Impossible Travel)

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M365 Portal Login (Impossible Travel)

Detects successful Microsoft 365 portal logins from impossible travel locations. Impossible travel locations are defined as two different countries within a short time frame. This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to access a Microsoft 365 account from a compromised account or a malicious actor attempting to access a Microsoft 365 account from a different location.

Rule type: threshold

Rule indices:

logs-o365.audit-*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-15m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

https://www.huntress.com/blog/time-travelers-busted-how-to-detect-impossible-travel-

Tags:

Domain: Cloud
Domain: SaaS
Data Source: Microsoft 365
Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs
Use Case: Threat Detection
Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
Tactic: Initial Access
Resources: Investigation Guide

Version: 7

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

edit

Triage and analysis

Investigating M365 Portal Login (Impossible Travel)

Microsoft 365’s cloud-based services enable global access, but this can be exploited by adversaries logging in from disparate locations within short intervals, indicating potential account compromise. The detection rule identifies such anomalies by analyzing login events for rapid geographic shifts, flagging suspicious activity that may suggest unauthorized access attempts.

Possible investigation steps

Review the user associated with these sign-ins to determine if the login attempt was legitimate or if further investigation is needed.
Analyze the geographic locations of the logins to identify any patterns or anomalies that may indicate malicious activity.
Review the ISP information for the login attempts to identify any unusual or suspicious providers.
Review the authorization request type to understand the context of the login attempts and whether they align with the user’s typical behavior.
Analyze the client application used for the login attempts to determine if it is consistent with the user’s normal usage patterns (Teams, Office, etc.)
Analyze the user-agent associated with the login attempts to identify any unusual or suspicious patterns.

False positive analysis

Users traveling or using VPNs may trigger this alert. Verify with the user if they were traveling or using a VPN at the time of the login attempt.
Mobile access may also result in false positives, as users may log in from various locations while on the go.

Response and remediation

Investigate the login attempt further by checking for any additional context or related events that may provide insight into the user’s behavior.
If the login attempt is deemed suspicious, consider implementing additional security measures, such as requiring multi-factor authentication (MFA) for logins from unusual locations.
Educate users about the risks of accessing corporate resources from unfamiliar locations and the importance of using secure connections (e.g., VPNs) when doing so.
Monitor for any subsequent login attempts from the same location or IP address to identify potential patterns of malicious activity.

Rule query

edit

event.dataset:o365.audit and
    event.provider:AzureActiveDirectory and
    event.action:UserLoggedIn and
    event.outcome:success and
    o365.audit.Target.Type:(0 or 10 or 2 or 3 or 5 or 6) and
    o365.audit.UserId:(* and not "Not Available") and
    source.geo.country_name:* and
    o365.audit.Target.ID:(
        00000006-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000 or
        4765445b-32c6-49b0-83e6-1d93765276ca
    ) and not o365.audit.ApplicationId:(
        29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e or
        38aa3b87-a06d-4817-b275-7a316988d93b or
        a809996b-059e-42e2-9866-db24b99a9782
    ) and not o365.audit.ExtendedProperties.RequestType:(
        "Cmsi:Cmsi" or
        "Consent:Set" or
        "Login:reprocess" or
        "Login:resume" or
        "MessagePrompt:MessagePrompt" or
        "SAS:EndAuth"
    )

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Initial Access
- ID: TA0001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
Technique:
- Name: Valid Accounts
- ID: T1078
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Cloud Accounts
- ID: T1078.004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/

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