Loading

Command Line Obfuscation via Whitespace Padding

Identifies process execution events where the command line value contains a long sequence of whitespace characters or multiple occurrences of contiguous whitespace. Attackers may attempt to evade signature-based detections by padding their malicious command with unnecessary whitespace characters. These observations should be investigated for malicious behavior.

Rule type: esql
Rule indices:

Rule Severity: medium
Risk Score: 47
Runs every:
Searches indices from: now-9m
Maximum alerts per execution: ?
References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Endpoint
  • OS: Windows
  • OS: macOS
  • OS: Linux
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Defense Evasion
  • Tactic: Execution
  • Resources: Investigation Guide

Version: ?
Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

This rule identifies process execution events where the command line value contains a long sequence of whitespace characters or multiple occurrences of contiguous whitespace. Attackers may attempt to evade signature-based detections by padding their malicious command with unnecessary whitespace characters.

  • Analyze the command line of the process in question for evidence of malicious code execution.
  • Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
  • Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
  • Investigate abnormal behaviors observed by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
  • Retrieve the process executable and determine if it is malicious:
    • Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
      • Observe and collect information about the following activities:
        • Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
        • File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
        • Service creation and launch activities.
        • Scheduled tasks creation.
    • Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
      • Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
  • Alerts derived from this rule are not inherently malicious. Analysts can dismiss the alert if they don't find enough evidence of further suspicious activity.
  • Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
  • Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
  • If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
    • Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
    • Stop suspicious processes.
    • Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
    • Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
  • Remove the malicious certificate from the root certificate store.
  • Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
  • Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
  • Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
  • Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
  • Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
FROM logs-* metadata _id, _version, _index
| where event.category == "process" and event.type == "start" and event.action != "fork"
// more than 100 spaces in process.command_line
| eval multi_spaces = LOCATE(process.command_line, space(100))
| where multi_spaces > 0
| keep user.name, host.id, host.name, process.command_line, process.executable, process.parent.executable

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK